Simulation idea details

In a computer game, no character can affect pixels (or the conductive rubber that controls them, or voltage) – they can only affect a group of pixels. A group of pixels differs from a pixel in that they are a semantic unit in the reality in which the character resides. In other words, they exist in different ontological spaces: objects made of pixels and the pixels themselves. In the world of Super Mario, there are no pixels, no display, no voltage. It contains objects made of pixels. Because pixels and Super Mario have fundamentally different natures. We say they exist in different ontological spaces.

If a robot is assembled from small parts, it can affect these small parts with its manipulator arms: washers and bolts scattered on the floor. But humans cannot fully affect elementary particles, some of them even (neutrinos). The world of quantum particles seems to exist on a different plane of existence—for example, physicists even say they're just "shadows": vibrations of objects from another reality—vibrations of branes. But that's precisely what it means: "their nature is different." Perhaps ontologically different, meaning not just physical, but located in other dimensions, or perhaps they're ontologically different, like pixels in the world of Super Mario.

All microparticles possess the property of identity: all electrons are identical (if they have the same spin), and so on. This is reminiscent of pixels: they, too, are practically identical. The difference appears in a group of pixels—and in a group of particles. Because at their ontological level, they are interchangeable and possess no individuality.

At their microlevel, microparticles are so fuzzy and indistinct that we cannot simultaneously determine their momentum and coordinates, for example. They are a joker, transforming from one into another. This also resembles pixels that change color. But a group of particles and a group of pixels are much more constant—a cup can exist for millennia. Super Mario or his pants exist throughout the entire game. And they change very little. We humans, like Super Mario, live on this level, where an algorithm, an idea, controls pixels, forming concepts (objects). The informational, non-extended, becomes material and extended, possessing limitations in size, mass, and so on.

The identity of particles, however, resembles words, concepts, noumena, and ideas in the world of ideas. For example, all electrons are identical. And all red circles are identical (if we characterize them only as "red" and "circle"). Therefore, the world of microparticles resembles the world of ideas—an immaterial, informational world. As if the foundation of our real, phenomenal, material world is immaterial, informational.

For example, space is such an unimaginable category. It is impossible to imagine such a thing without resorting to mathematics and its abstractions of "let's" and "introduce." Another aporia is the indivisibility of space. The inconceivability of the smallest particle of matter. And so on (time, etc.).

When scientists think about the world outside the simulation, they imagine a world like ours, with computers and creatures running our world on their computers as a game. This gives rise to the following two problems:

• potentially infinite recursion
• the futility of simulation theory

The futility of simulation theory means the following. Initially, the cave-simulation theory was arrived at because of certain unsolvable problems and inconceivable, yet key, concepts in our world (paradoxes-aporias). If we assume that the upper world is material (it contains a computer!), then we will inevitably arrive at the same aporias there. This means that simulation theory as we know it today has no particular value.

The idea that our world is illusory lies precisely in the fact that there is another world, which is declared to be devoid of these paradoxes. Their solution is impossible in the material world; such concepts simply cannot exist. They are unimaginable, inexplicable, and impossible.

So the "upper" world, perfect and devoid of these paradoxes, is different. What kind? Obviously, immaterial. Perhaps our "material" world is created by the immaterial world.

Why? If the upper world were material, we would imagine, like scientists, some "material" causes: research, entertainment, etc.

But if the upper world is immaterial, then it is difficult for us to imagine the mind inhabiting it.

Perhaps God was bored and unimaginably afraid to be in a dark "nowhere" without walls, windows, or light, forever alone. Or perhaps the higher mind creates the lower reality by virtue of its nature, as Hindu philosophers suggested.

If we accept this, we automatically come to religion.

Islam embraces the concept of tanzīh - transcendence: God is not located in any one place or moment in time, nor is He extended in space; in other words, He is outside our reality, but He is capable of existing within it as well.

ChatGPT-5 responds to this:

The image of a solitary mind sitting in a black void is compelling, but it is anthropomorphic. Emptiness, darkness, silence are the conditions of creation. God is not a mind floating in a vacuum; He is the necessary, self-sufficient reality on which any vacuum would depend. In classical terms (for example, Avicenna's "necessary being"), the essence of God is existence, uncaused and limitless, while everything else is contingent—whether it may exist or not depends on His existence.

Next:

Absolute Unity (Tawḥīd al-Dhāt): God's essence is utterly indivisible. Shia theology strongly emphasizes that God's attributes are not separate from His essence. For example, His knowledge is His essence—not something added to it.

That is, God's attributes are God himself. For example, fat John means many things, such as that there are fat Johns, and perhaps not only Johns, and that, obviously, there are not fat Johns, etc. But in the case of God, we would say "fat"—only he, it's his other name. Where can one encounter such a thing? In an impersonal, object-less information environment, in a program, for example, where Visitor is a function, an attribute, and a class name— they are all one and the same. For example, the IOpening interface. It's something that opens. Visitor has the attribute "be able to visit." Visiting something is its function and its name.

By this logic, God is the same; he and his attribute ("IOpening" in the case of a program) are one and the same. The only difference is that God has more such attributes, and not just one property—for example, "opening."

?
|
+-- The natural world
|   +-- The only one
|   +-- Not the only one
+-- The unnatural world
    +-- The world is material and created
    +-- The world is immaterial and simulated
        +-- Infinite simulations
        |   +-- Recursive
        |   +-- Non-recursive (world generator)
        +-- Non-infinite simulations
            +-- The first (real) world is God's
            +-- The first (real) world is the Programmer's

And there are two more strange possibilities: our world is a dream. And the second is that the world external to us is devoid of paradoxes and aporias because it is magical.

I just read an interesting statement: "If everything around us is 'unreal,' immaterial, just fields and electrical signals, then why do we think there's something else, something true? Maybe there's no truth, no reality, everything is a lie?"

Basically, it's the theory of an infinite recursive simulation. Or an infinite dream. A being whose nature is completely thought out down to the smallest detail, and which lives in someone else's dream or simulation—is it a philosophical zombie? Or is it self-aware? Or can a philosophical zombie also be self-aware? Or is its awareness incomplete?

If we accept the simulation hypothesis, then the necessity of accepting the multiplicity of worlds is automatic – there are at least two worlds: the simulated (or imaginary) and the "real" one. Or more than two. But if we consider worlds in the framework of the dichotomy of "material" and "immaterial," then the paradox and the greatest probability lies with the hypothesis that the material world is ours. And the external, real world is not material and, perhaps, by our standards, it appears to be a magical world, because our world is not just imperfect, it is logically imperfect. And imagining such a world for the matrix programmer is simply impossible – this would automatically make it simulated, again material and, therefore, unreal. There is only one solution: to assume the existence of a real world – the hypothetical World of Amber. In general, the Quran confirms precisely this hypothesis: the World of Allah is Himself, followed by the world of the "interface" - between Him and Matter - a very subtle world of "robots" made of… "light," of some kind of radiation - angels, they monitor and record everything that happens in our world - they possess the highest speed (they are made of light), presence (light), and are necessary for the proper functioning of the entire system.

We can even introduce terminology:

external world

a world external to ours, a world outside

higher world

a world of a different order, a different nature, a different reality

root world

primary, it has no external worlds (this

definition requires the hypothesis of a finite nesting of worlds)

The external world is not necessarily higher. But the root world is necessarily higher. The Higher World is devoid of all the paradoxes and aporias of the lower worlds, but it is unlimited, and therefore internally contradictory—that is, it is pure potential, it can give birth to everything and allows everything, it is the world of Allah and it is immaterial. It does not have the servers on which our world runs.